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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider one aspect of the 
problem of applying decision theory to the 
design of agents that learn how to make de­
cisions under uncertainty. This aspect con­
cerns how an agent can estimate probabili­
ties for the possible states of the world, given 
that it only makes limited observations be­
fore committing to a decision. We show that 
the naive application of statistical tools can 
be improved upon if the agent can determine 
which of his observations are truly relevant 
to the estimation problem at hand. We give 
a framework in which such determinations 
can be made, and define an estimation pro­
cedure to use them. Our framework also sug­
gests several extensions, which show how ad­
ditional knowledge can be used to improve 
the estimation procedure still :'urther. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The problem we consider in this paper is how to es­
timate probabilities for states of the world, so that 
agents can use the techniques of decision theory to 
make decisions under uncertainty. We illustrate this 
problem with an example. Suppose we wish to de­
sign an agent M whose function is to deliver packages 
around town as swiftly as possible. We could program 
M with a set of different methods for doing this; for 
instance, it can drive between destinations using ei­
ther the freeway system or city roads, it can walk, it 
can give the package to the postal service to deliver 
instead, and so on. Let us ignore the enormous task 
of implementing each method, which is, in essence, a 
planning problem and beyond the scope of this work. 
Here we ask how the agent is to decide between them. 
For this example, we might take the following sim­
plistic view of the world. First, we suppose that the 
time taken to drive depends, in a known way, only 
on whether traffic is congested. The time taken to 
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walk depends (again, in a known way) on the weather 
conditions. Posting the package takes constant time. 
Now we ask M to deliver a particular package. Af 
must commit to a method before finding out about 
the traffic or whether it will rain. If M can associate a 
probability with each relevant possibility, then it can 
calculate expected time for each method and decide 
accordingly. 
We will assume that M has been in situations like 
this before (presumably this is the case once it has 
been operational for a while), and so it can estimate 
probabilities from stored observations. However, M 
might actually know a lot about the current situation: 
it could know the time, the day of week, the season, 
today's weather forecast, the package's weight, the re­
cipient, whether the car has been serviced recently, the 
price of a postage stamp, and so on. What we really 
want is the probability of each of the events of interest 
(such as, it is sunny but traffic is light) conditioned on 
what is known. This presents a problem because, once 
we take all of this knowledge into account, most of M's 
previous data no longer pertains directly. The main is­
sue studied in this paper is how we can decide what 
information can be safely ignored as being irrelevant, 
so improving the quality of the estimated probabilities. 
The agent M might have very little data directly ap­
plicable to estimating the chance of "fine weather and 
light traffic" given all he knows, because it is likely lvf 
hasn't been in an identical situation often before. But 
we know that a lot of M's knowledge-for instance, 
the nature of the package and the condition of the 
car-has nothing at all to do with the weather or road 
conditions. If we estimate probabilities conditional on 
just relevant data, such as the forecast and the time 
of day, there will be many more observations that can 
be used. 
The model which stands at the heart of classical de­
cision theory, and on which our work is based, is the 
decision matrix (see [Savage, 1954] for definitions, and 
Section 5 for some discussion of related work in AI). 
As explained in Section 2, applying this technique re­
quires the estimation of the probabilities of the various 
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states of the world that the agent considers possible. 
Using these probabilities, the agent can estimate the 
expected utility for each alternative action, and choose 
the one that maximizes that quantity. Unlike many 
previous works (e.g. [Simon and Kadane, 1975]), we do 
not assume that these probabilities are made available 
by an external source. More realistically, we assume 
that the agent uses its own experience as the major 
source of information. The agent will thus learn from 
experience, by gradually refining its estimates. 
Our method for estimating probabilities, which is 
based on a procedure that attempts to discover ir­
relevant attributes, is described in Section 3. Some 
extensions are outlined in Section 4. Our technique 
combines concepts reminiscent of probabilistic refer­
ence hierarchies (see, for example, [Bacchus, 1988]) 
with statistical tools. It thus enables using statistical 
data, as well as less precise notions about relevance 
that the designer might have. 
2 THE UNDERLYING MODEL 
The decision-making module takes a decision problem, 
creates a decision-matrix, and uses that matrix to de­
cide on a course of action. Each row of the decision 
matrix is a possible action under consideration by the 
agent. For example, agent !If's actions might con­
sist of: drive on a freeway, drive on the city roads, 
walk, and send by mail. Of course, these high-level 
actions usually represent complex plans consisting of 
many atomic steps; the model we are using ignores 
the planning problem of how to determine these steps. 
The columns of the matrix are possible states of the 
world, where each state has an associated probability 
(the probability that it holds in this particular decision 
situation). These two components of the matri.." will 
be described later in this section. The elements of the 
matrix are the agent's outcomes for each action/state 
pair. It is a well-known result of decision theory (see 
[Savage, 1954)) that in many cases, the agent's pref­
erence ordering on outcomes can be expressed by nu­
merical utilities. In the particular context of intelligent 
agents, the utility will often be expressed in terms of 
certain parameters, such as time, fuel consumption, or 
money. For example, we might use time as our mea­
sure of utility for M. In our paper, we assume that 
the matrix entries are utilities, and are given in ad­
vance. Once the entire decision matrix is available, 
the agent simply chooses the action with ma."imum 
expected utility. 
2.1 STATES AND EVENTS 
We adopt a framework in which the agent observes 
and reasons about the world using a fixed set of at­
tributes, A = { A1, ... , An}, which take on values in 
a finite space. For example, the attribute "day of 
the week" has a natural set of values; an attribute 
such as "weather" would be partitioned into values 
(e.g. raining, cloudy, fine), where the granularity of 
the partition will depend on the agent's needs. This 
vocabulary must be chosen carefully, as it greatly af­
fects the performance of the decision-making module 
The attributes should be chosen to be, in some sense, 
independent of each other. See Section 4 for further 
discussion. 
The most specific assertion we can make about the 
world is to announce the value of each A E A. This 
exactly determines the world as far as the agent's vo­
cabulary allows it to differentiate. We therefore define 
a state to be an assignment of a value to every at­
tribute in A. In the decision-theoretic paradigm, the 
agent's uncertainty is modeled via the existence of sev­
eral states that the agent believes the world could be 
in.1 In general, some of the attributes in A will have 
no connection to the decision at hand (i.e. will not 
affect the outcomes of the contemplated actions). For 
example, although M might have an attribute describ­
ing the last time the car was serviced, the value of this 
attribute would not be relevant to the time it takes 
M to deliver a certain package. We define an event E 
to be a list of values for a subset A' of the attributes 
in A. We say that an event E obtains when the true 
state agrees with Eon all attributes in A'. 
We assume that the columns of the decision matrix are 
all events which contain values for some specific subset 
A' of A. Ideally, these attributes should be those that 
have some connection with the actions or the decision 
under consideration. The smaller A' is, the easier it 
is to make the decision2 In our example, A' might 
consist of the attributes "weather" and "traffic den­
sity", and the column events would be all the possible 
assignments of values to these two attributes. 
The initial information I denotes the set of attribute­
value pairs that the agent observes in a particular de­
cision making situation, i.e., before an action is chosen 
and executed. It should be clear that I is also an event. 
2.2 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
The decision-theoretic model we are using here as­
sumes the existence of some objective probability dis­
tribution on the possible states. That is, let W be 
the set of all possible states of the world. We are 
assuming that W has the additional structure of a 
(presumably unknown) probability space (W, 1r) . It 
is unlikely to be true, in any meaningful sense, that 
the actual state of the world is a random draw from 
1This is similar to the familiar concept of "possible 
worlds". 
2For choosing A', all we need is some, possibly incom­
plete, knowledge about which attributes are "relevant" to 
an action. It is not necessary to know how or why a certain 
attribute affects the consequence of the action, or even be 
certain that it really does. 
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some probability distribution, but the probabilistic 
model is often a good approximation to the intricately 
causal way the world actually works. For further dis­
cussion, see, for example, [Cox, 1961; Jaynes, 1968; 
Savage, 1954). 
In our model, a decision-making situation evolves as 
follows. At the time the agent learns that he is to make 
a decision, the actual state of the world is regarded as 
being randomly chosen according to (W, 1r). The agent 
has the capability of observing the values of some of 
the attributes, and so gains some initial information I 
about the chosen state. It then chooses an action (i.e., 
makes a decision), and afterwards, perhaps because of 
the action's execution, it learns more about what the 
world was like at decision time. That is, it learns the 
values of more attributes. 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION 
We assume that the agent has a database 1) of obser­
vations relating to past experiences (the integration of 
other types of data into our model will be discussed 
briefly in Section 4). To be more specific, we as­
sume that every data point D E 1) actually arose from 
some earlier decision-making episode. Thus D con­
tains, among possibly other things, the values for the 
attributes that were observed before and during the 
decision process, i.e., the agent's information about 
the state of the world holding at the time. 
In order to simplify the model, we might make a com­
plete observability assumption: the agent always ob­
serves the value of every attribute in A. Consider 
the following example, which illustrates what can go 
wrong without some such requirement. Suppose that 
M is sometimes told about baseball games taking place 
in the city, and that when there is a baseball game 
M usually decides to walk (perhaps because baseball 
games generally take place when the weather is fine). 
Suppose, in violation of complete observability, that if 
the agent chooses to walk it does not find out about 
the traffic conditions. Then if the traffic density is 
in fact heavier on days in which a game takes place, 
M's estimate for the probability of heavy traffic will 
be lower than the true value, because most of its obser­
vations will be taken on days when there is no game. 
In general, complete observability avoids this and sim­
ilar errors because it implies that every observation 
in 1) truly is a random sample from (W,1r), free of 
unwanted bias. 
In practice, complete observability can be weakened to 
independent observability, which says that the set of 
attributes the agent gets to learn about is determined 
independently of both the actual state of the world, 
and of any decision the agent takes. In the above ex­
ample this was violated, because whether or not the 
traffic was observed depended on whether the agent 
decided to walk, and it was this that induced bias. Of 
course, the independent observability requirement by 
itself offers no guarantee that we ever see enough data 
to estimate all the required probabilities. So it is also 
necessary to assume that, whenever A' defines the set 
of events for some decision the agent might be asked to 
make, then the chance of observing this set should be 
nonzero. Even this requirement can be weakened. For 
instance, if two attributes are rarely observed together, 
appropriate assumptions about conditional indepen­
dence can be used so as to still permit accumulation 
of sufficient historical data. 
In subsequent sections, we shall simplify the presen­
tation by stating our results and techniques in terms 
of the complete observability assumption only. How­
ever, the extensions to the weaker, but more realistic, 
conditions are straightforward. 
In practice, the most restrictive consequences of our 
model are as follows. First, the requirement that the 
information observed is an event amounts to assuming 
that the agent either identifies, without uncertainty, 
the value of an attribute or else learns nothing at all 
about it. But we note that if the set A is chosen 
well, this assumption should cause relatively little dif­
ficulty. The other problem with our model relates to 
the amount of data stored: there is little obvious scope 
for data summarization or compression. Currently, our 
estimation procedure requires every observation to be 
remembered (or, only slightly better, remember counts 
for observations that occur frequently). Significant 
improvements are likely to depend on domain-specific 
structure. 
3 THE ESTI MATION PROBLE M 
Let us review the probability estimation problem. We 
have some initial information I. We have determined 
a list of events which are the columns of the decision 
matrix, and wish to estimate p = Pr(EII) for each 
event E. Of course, how best to form these estimates 
is a problem in statistics. 
One simple and theoretically sound estimate of p is 
simply the proportion of data points agreeing with E, 
among all points that agree with I. This estimate is 
"good" in several ways: for instance, it is unbiased 
(i.e., the expected value is exactly p) and its variance 
decreases to zero as the number of relevant data points 
grows. The problem is that the number of relevant 
data points may not grow very quickly because this 
estimate uses only those observations which agree ex­
actly with I. But perhaps situations matching I have 
not been encountered very often. For instance, if time 
and date are part of I, there will be no relevant his­
torical data at all. We conclude that this simple esti­
mation procedure is often impractical. 
To salvage the approach to decision making we are 
looking at, we need to be much more clever about how 
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we estimate probabilities. The main result of this sec­
tion is a technique for probability estimation which 
can yield substantially better results than the above. 
It does this by providing a framework which can cap­
ture and make use of additional information we have 
about the structure of the world (see Section 4). The 
underlying idea is the observation that the less specific 
the information in I, the more useful data points we 
will have. Therefore, the estimate would improve if 
we could (justifiably!) ignore some of the attributes 
mentioned in I. 
It seems to be often true that, in any given context, 
only a few attributes will be relevant to whether some 
event E occurs. Consider the example in the introduc­
tion, where I records, among other things, which day 
of the week it is. If the attributes in E all refer to nat­
ural phenomena, such as the the weather conditions, 
we would expect the day of the week to be irrelevant 
to-and, in a sense which is easy to make precise, in­
dependent of-whether E occurs. In this case, the best 
estimate of p would pool data for all days, even though 
this ignores some of the knowledge contained in I. In 
general, it is not reasonable to require all such infor­
mation about relevance to be supplied ahead of time. 
In the example, we would want the estimation proce­
dure to find out for itself whether the day of the week 
is unimportant. 
We begin by looking at the base case of our technique. 
Suppose I includes the value of some attribute A. Let 
h, h, . . .  , Ik be all events which are just like I, except 
possibly with respect to the value of A; we may as­
sume that h = I. Intuitively, we can pool data only 
if our knowledge about A is irrelevant to p. More for­
mally, we ask whether the conditional probabilities Pi 
(i.e., Pr(EII;)) are the same for all i. Our procedure 
is to test whether this independence is plausible, and 
then use either the pooled or non-pooled estimate as 
appropriate. Both the test and the estimate itself can 
make use of all the observed data in 1). 
In the following, let N; be the number of observations 
in 1) agreeing with I;. Let Pi be the proportion of 
these observations that do in fact agree with the values 
specified in E. We estimate p either as p1 or else as 
the pooled estimate p = 0::"'1 p;N;)/N, where N = 
2:: "'1 N;. Note that p1 is simply the direct estimate 
which was mentioned earlier. We decide which of these 
two possibilities to use on the basis of a hypothesis test 
(the hypothesis being that p; = Pi> for all i,j.) 
One relatively simple hypothesis test we can use 
for this is the x2 test, which is discussed in most 
statistics texts (such as, [Larsen and Marx, 1981; 
Sachs, 1982]). The test is based t•n the value X2 = 
2:::"'1 (p;- fi? N;j(p(1- p)). If the hypothesis (equal 
Pi) is true, and the Ni are not too small,3 then the dis-
3 A frequently stated rule of thumiJ is that N;p; should 
tribution of X2 is very well approximated by the x2 
distribution with k- 1 degrees of freedom. In order to 
perform the test, we must choose some small a > 0, 
which becomes the chance of not pooling data when it 
really would have been permissible. We accept the hy­
pothesis and use the pooled estimate just if X2 < ca, 
where c" is such that the chance of a random sam­
ple from x2 exceeding c" is a. The value c" can be 
found from tables. It is generally desirable to have a 
very small, but note that as a decreases the chance of 
incorrectly deciding to pool data when this is not jus­
tified grows. Later we state two asymptotic properties 
of our estimation procedure, whose proof assumes that 
a is 1/ Nd, for some d > 1. That is, as the sample size 
increases we should tolerate less chance of deciding in­
correctly not to pool data. It turns out that, so long 
as a grows smaller no faster than this, the chance of 
pooling inappropriately also diminishes rapidly. 
To recap, the general idea of our procedure is to test for 
independence and then use the estimate suggested by 
the result of the test. The hypothesis test can be done 
in many ways, and we have suggested one possibility, 
the x2 test. We chose this test because its simplicity 
facilitates the analysis. 
This analysis is important because the procedure uses 
the same data for both the independence test and for 
the actual estimate. In this way, we can hope to make 
the best use of scarce data. But reusing sampled data 
destroys the independence between the outcome of the 
hypothesis test and the estimate used, and so we must 
check that the process as a whole gives us a useful re­
sult. For example, it is easy to see that both the pooled 
estimate p and the simple estimate p1 are unbiased if 
the hypothesis of equal Pi is in fact true. But it does 
not follow just from this that the composite estimate 
is unbiased.4 Another related issue concerns the esti­
mate's variance: intuitively, we only pool data if all 
the p; are approximately the same, and so it might 
seem that the pooled estimate is only used when it 
provides little additional information over p1 anyway. 
It turns out that neither of these problems arise: the 
estimate we give is asymptotically unbia�ed, and has 
asymptotic variance that can be much smaller than 
p1. In other words, at least for large N, our estimate 
is indeed very likely to be close to the true value. Fur­
thermore, if the hypothesis of equal p; is true, then 
our estimate has smaller variance than the simple un­
pooled estimate p1 and so is likely to be much closer to 
p. The formal statement of these results is contained 
be larger than 5, for all i. 
4To illustrate the possible problems, suppose that the 
test is such that the hypothesis of equal p; is slightly more 
likely to be accepted when the observations satisfy p < fj, 
than it is otherwise. Then this would bias our estimate. 
Because we reuse data, the test does get to see the actual 
values of the estimates p and fj,, and so such behavior 
cannot be ruled out without deeper analysis. 
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in the following two theorems (whose proofs are too 
long for inclusion here) .5 
Theorem 3.1: If in fact p; = p for all i, then the 
estimate we give has mean J.l and variance cr2 such 
that J.l-->P and cr2--+p(1 - p)/ N as N ---+oo.6 We 
note that this asymptotic variance is t he best that can 
be achieved by any unbiased estimate, even if we know 
for certain that t he hypothesis of equal probabilities is 
t rue. 
Theorem 3.2: If in fact p; i: Pi for some i, j then 
the estimate we give has mean J.l, and variance cr2 such 
that J.l-->Pl and cr2-->p1 (1- pt)f N1 as N ---+00. We 
note t hat this asymptotic variance is the smallest pos­
sible amongst unbiased estimates of p; (given that ob­
servations relating to  I;, for i -j: 1, are regarded as 
being not informative about p1). 
Although these theorems give asymptotic results only, 
it seems very likely that the procedure will work well 
for far smaller sample sizes than were required in our 
proof. Proving a precise claim about this would be dif­
ficult. Instead, we have programmed the technique to 
run on simulated data, and the results there did con­
firm this expectation. When the data was generated 
for each class using the same underlying probability, 
the decision was made to pool data most of the time. 
In one typical experiment, 200 data points were succes­
sively generated for each of five events, and on average 
the procedure declined to pool data less than 5% of the 
time. If the probabilities differ between classes, even 
by relatively small amounts-and note that the closer 
the probabilities are to being equal, the less damage is 
done by incorrect pooling-our procedure rapidly dis­
covered this. In one experiment, where the difference 
between all probabilities was less than or equal to 0.1, 
the procedure apparently stabilized on a decision not 
to pool after each class had accumulated about 150 
data points. A similar experiment where the proba­
bilities differed by up to 0.3 stabilized after about 15 
data points per event on average. 
The procedure so far will, in effect, decide whether to 
ignore one particular attribute of I. In general, sev­
eral attributes of I may turn out to be irrelevant. Our 
technique extends easily to such cases. Suppose that 
we have decided to ignore some attribute A of I (using 
a test like that just suggested). That is, we have ac­
cepted the hypothesis that P1·(E\I) = Pr(E\I') for all 
5Note that if we did not reuse dat�, the proof of these 
theorems would be nearly trivial (becaase then the hypoth­
esis test would be certain to be independent of both p and 
P• ). Furthermore, the results would be somewhat tighter; 
e.g. , the composite estimate would be unbiased even for 
finite sample sizes. 
6This is not quite correct as stated, because N can grow 
without bound even as some No stays small. The conver­
gence we have in mind here is that, as N tends to infinity, 
each N; must be bounded below by Nc for some c > 0. 
I' that are like I except for the value of A. But from 
this it also follows that Pr(E\I) = P r(E\(1 - A)), 
where by I - A we mean the event formed from I by 
omitting A and its value. We have thus reduced our 
problem to finding a good estimate of the latter prob­
ability. The earlier procedure-looking for irrelevant 
attributes-is immediately applicable again. In this 
way, we can achieve a substantial increase in the qual­
ity of the estimate. Note that we do not require that 
the attributes be considered in any particular order. 
4 JUSTIFICATION AND 
EXTENSIONS 
The success of our technique depends on whether the 
vocabulary of attributes used to define events really 
reflects the way the world works. For example, the at­
tributes A, = day of t he week and A2 = t he weather seem to be fairly independent of each other; there are 
many contexts where just one of these is relevant. On 
the other hand, consider A�, which tells us the day of 
the week if it is Monday or Wednesday and the weather 
otherwise, and A� which tells us the weather on Mon­
day or Wednesday, and the day otherwise. It is not 
easy to imagine a context where just one of {A�, A�} 
is relevant. Both these sets of attributes are equally 
informative for describing what the world is actually 
like. Our judgment that {A1, A2} is better seems to be based on knowledge we have about the causal struc­
ture of the world? Our technique is a framework that 
allows such knowledge to be usefully incorporated into 
the decision making process. Equally important is that 
we do not rely on a precise or accurate statement of 
this knowledge. 
Sometimes we have additional knowledge, beyond just 
a feeling about what a suitable attribute vocabulary 
should be. A feature of our technique is that it al­
lows easy extensions to cope with many types of extra 
information. For instance: 
• If we are able to provide actual probabilities di­
rectly, there is nothing preventing them being 
used; the estimation procedure can be bypassed 
when not needed. Similarly, the method can be 
modified to incorporate statistical data from di­
verse external sources. 
• If we know that some particular attributes can be 
ignored in certain contexts, then the hypothesis 
test is redundant and can be omitted. In partic­
ular, if some restrictions on the possible relation­
ships between attributes are given to the agent 
(for example, as a reference hierarchy), this can be 
used in our process. By avoiding the hypothesis 
7This is reminiscent of the well-known "grue/bleen" 
paradox ([Goodman, 1955]), which concerns the attribute 
vocabulary appropriate for inductive inference. 
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test, we gain computational efficiency and elimi­
nate the chance of error. 
• Suppose we know that if some attribute is rele­
vant, then it must affect probabilities in a partic­
ular way. As an example, I am not sure whether 
the probability of traffic congestion on a particu­
lar highway depends on which day of the week it 
is. I know that, if the day of the week is in fact rel­
evant, then this probability is lower on weekends. 
This knowledge suggests using a different test for 
independence. We test the hypothesis that the 
probability is independent of the day, against the 
alternatives (which have different probabilities f01' 
each day, but definitely lower on Saturday and 
Sunday). We omit details of such a test here. In 
general, whenever our knowledge can restrict the 
possible alternatives, a hypothesis test can achieve 
the same confidence using less data. 
• So far, we have regarded the classes considered 
for pooling as being implicitly defined by the 
attribute vocabulary. However, our knowledge 
about the domain may suggest other classes as 
well. In our earlier example, to estimate the 
chance of heavy traffic congestion on a Tuesday 
it might be useful to consider pooling data over 
just weekdays (Monday to Friday), as well as over 
the class of all days. It is even possible to use 
statistical procedures to suggest useful classes, on 
the basis of previously collected data (but then 
we must be careful to use a different set of data 
for the hypothesis test and estimation procedure, 
because the results would be statistically invalid 
otherwise). 
Finally, we note that the correctness of our technique 
depends on the stability over time of the underlying 
probability distribution. If this cannot be assumed it 
would be sensible to ignore or discount older obser�a­
tions. There are several standard ways this might be 
done. Nevertheless, it is clear that robustness against 
changes in the underlying distribution can only be ob­
tained at the price of slower or Jess accurate learning. 
5 CO M PARISON TO O THER 
WORK 
Although many techniques of decision theory have 
been utilized in artificial intelligence, the decision ma­
trix paradigm of separating the probabilities of states 
from the utilities has been relatively ignored. Many 
researchers who adopt the concept of maximizing ex­
pected utility (see [Etzioni, 1989b; Horvitz, 1988; 
Wellman, 1990; Russel and Wefald, 1988]) compute 
the expected utility for each action directly. A sepa­
rate computation of utilities has the major advantage 
of allowing additional information about utilities and 
probabilities, arising from different sources, to be used. 
The description of a state may be detailed enough so 
that the utility of an action at that state can be com­
p�ted using knowledge about causality that the agent 
might have. For example, the agent might know that 
when the state of the world is such that there is light 
traffic and the weather is good, then the action of driv­
ing ten miles on a freeway must take about ten min­
utes, because the average velocity in those conditions 
is 55 miles per hour. Also, by dividing the estimation 
process into two stages, more historical data will be us­
able. For example, the agent might conclude that the 
exact day of the week (say Friday) is relevant to the 
probability of having heavy traffic, and will therefore 
use only the historical data about Friday to compute 
it. But heavy traffic also occurs on other days ( al­
tJ:ough with different probabilities), so that the agent 
will be able to use all that additional data to compute 
the expected driving time given heavy traffic. This 
leads to more accurate estimates. 
'Yhile some research in AI has adopted this separa­
tiOn of probabilities and utilities (notably [Haddawy 
and Hanks, 1990; Simon and Kadane, 1975]), the 
problem of estimating the probabilities in the face of 
too much initial information has not, to our knowl­
edge, been attacked directly. Some works [Simon and 
Kadane, 1975) simply assume that the probabilities 
are known in advance. Others (e.g. [Bundy, 1984; 
Lee and Mahajan, 1988]) suggest the concept of sam­
plin�, but do not discuss which class to sample. Ren­
dell l�endell, 1983) deals �ith the concept of sampling 
on different classes, but m the very limited context 
of search trees. Etzioni's work [Etzioni, 1989a) on es­
ti.mating u�ilities is based on machine learning tech­mques, which attempt to discover classes over which 
the utility is homogeneous. Such homogeneity usu­
ally arises due to a deterministic relationship between 
the properties of the class and the utility (such as the 
driving time given light traffic described above). These 
techniques do not carry over to estimating probabili­
ties, because the only way to achieve homogeneity in 
classes of binary values is to have the entire class be 
all zeros or all ones. I.e., the class will be such that 
it deterministically forces the truth value of the event. 
Typically, it is impossible to find an attribute language 
precise enough to define such classes. 
A different approach to finding the right class for esti­
mating probabilities is to treat the problem of inferring 
the independence structure as a separate task. For ex­
ample, [Fung and Crawford, 1990) use techniques sim­
ilar to ours-classical statistics, and in particular, the 
x2 test-in a system which infers qualitative structure 
from data, modeling this structure as a probabilistic 
network. Once constructed, the network can be used 
for several purposes, such as estimation. The major 
drawback of this technique is that a separate data set 
is required for the construction of the network. It is 
not clear how this technique can be safely extended 
to reuse data. Therefore, larger amounts of data will 
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be needed. Our approach is also better in situations 
where new data is being constantly accumulated, be­
cause the new information could cause us to change 
our decision as to the relevance of certain attributes. 
[Fung and Crawford, 1990] also show how to find the 
smallest possible set of relevant attributes. This proce­
dure is computationally expensive and relies on strong 
assumptions about the relationships among the at­
tributes. These assumptions also prevent the proce­
dure in [Fung and Crawford, 1990] from being effi­
ciently used in our framework, because each decision 
situation will need to be investigated separately. This 
eliminates the computational advantage of computing 
the entire independence structure simultaneously. Our 
approach eliminates the attributes one by one, in an 
arbitrary order. While not guaranteed to find the min­
imal set of relevant attributes, this technique is much 
faster and requires no assumptions. 
We conclude this section by comparing our methods 
to the Bayesian approach. It should be noted that, 
if prior probabilities are available, Bayesian updating 
(see [Jaynes, 1968]) can, in a sense, replace the x2 test 
described in Section 3. \Ve have chosen not to ussume 
the existence of prior probabilities, and therefore use 
a technique from classical statistics. A work similar 
in outlook to ours, which deals with a different prob­
lem using Bayesian techniques is Pearl's work about 
hierarchies of hypotheses [Pearl, 1986]. 
6 CONCLUSION 
We have investigated the problem of estimating the 
conditional probability of a state given some initial 
information I ,  based on a database of observations. 
This problem is straightforward when there is plenty of 
data. However, in many situations, there is little data 
that exactly matches I. Our main result discusses how 
to utilize the available data in order to decide which 
attributes in I are irrelevant, and how to use the in­
formation about irrelevance to improve the estimate's 
quality. A feature of our approach is that it uses all 
the available data for both this decision and for the 
actual estimation. 
We have discussed in detail the assumptions that are 
required to make our approach sound. For example, 
the model is simplified by the (commonly made) as­
sumption we call complete observability, that is, that 
all data points contain observations about every at­
tribute. However, we discuss a relaxation of this, in­
dependent observability, which is far more realistic yet 
still permits efficient estimation. 
The idea behind our approach to estimation is not 
limited to finding conditional probabilities. For in­
stance, in the context of decision theory which moti­
vates the work in this paper, another important appli­
cation would be the estimation of utilities; we believe 
that this is likely to be a straightforward extension of 
the present work. 
The most important factor in the success of our ap­
proach will be the quality of the attribute vocabulary 
that the agent uses to describe the world. Whether 
made explicit or not, this theme recurs throughout AI. 
In our approach, this issue is prominent, and we may 
hope that our more technical results and discussion 
will serve to shed some light on this fundamental is­
sue. 
Finally, we note that one of the advantages of our 
framework is that it can be extended in several di­
rections, to make use of other knowledge aside from 
raw observational data. A few suggestions towards 
this were described in Section 4, but clearly this does 
not exhaust all the possibilities. 
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